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RECENT ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS *
MILToN HANDLER t
Antitrust's fever chart during the past twelve months has had
more than its usual peaks and valleys. The Supreme Court's grist was
abnormally high,1 but there was nothing abnormal about the fact that
most of the judgments went against the defendants.2 The feature of
the Court's work that has the "man bites dog" type of newsworthiness
was Justice Douglas' lengthy quotation in White Motor Co. v. United
States' of Brandeis' classic formulation of the rule of reason, plus
the citation of Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States4 in Silver v.
* This Article is based upon a lecture before the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York on June 6, 1963. The section, "THE ArERMATH OF BROWN SHOE"
has been substantially altered from its form in the oral address to reflect the recent
decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S.
321 (1963).
t Professor of Law, Columbia University. A.B. 1924, LL.B. 1926, Columbia
University. Member, New York Bar.
1 United States v. Bliss & Laughlin, Inc., 371 U.S. 70 (1962) ; United States v.
Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Los Angeles Meat & Provision Drivers Union v.
United States, 371 U.S. 94 (1962); United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp.,
372 U.S. 29 (1963); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296
(1963) ; Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963) ; FTC v. Sun Oil Co.,
371 U.S. 505 (1963) ; White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963) ; United
States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963) ; United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
2 United States v. Bliss & Laughlin, Inc., supra note 1; United States v. Loew's,
Inc., supra note 1; Los Angeles Meat & Provision Drivers Union v. United States,
supra note 1; United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., supra note 1; Silver v.
New York Stock Exch., supra note 1; FTC v. Sun Oil Co., supra note 1; United
States v. Singer Mfg. Co., supra note 1; United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,
supra note 1.
3 372 U.S. 253, 261-62 (1963).
4 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) :
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To
bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether
the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.
(159)
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New York Stock Exch.' A revitalization of the Brandeis conception
of the rule of reason-the antithesis of the current per se philosophy-
would indeed be a noteworthy event, but obviously it would take more
than a copious quotation or a passing citation for that to occur. None-
theless, defendants in merger cases enjoyed a spectacular winning
streak-six out of six q-until the Supreme Court came down with its
decision in United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank.7 Even the
Federal Trade Commission at long last broke down and upheld a
merger.' The courts of appeals have become increasingly unkind to
the Commission, and, instead of rubberstamping its decisions, have
repudiated it ten times since last June.9 Gone, perhaps forever, is the
To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts pecu-
liar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and
after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect,
actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the
reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be
attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will
save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowl-
edge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict conse-
quences.
5373 U.S. 341, 360 (1963): "But, under the aegis of the rule of reason, tradi-
tional antitrust concepts are flexible enough to permit the Exchange sufficient breathing
space within which to carry out the mandate of the Securities Exchange Act," citing
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918), and United States v.
Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 394-95 (1912).
6United States v. Continental Can Co., 217 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
United States v. Lever Bros., 216 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) ; United States v.
Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1963); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 214 F. Supp. 501 (N.D.N.Y. 1963) ; United States v. Bliss & Laughlin,
Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 70734 (S.D. Cal. March 27, 1963) ; United
States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 1962 Trade Cas. 70571 (D. Utah 1962), prob.
Juris. noted, 373 U.S. 930 (1963).
7 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
8 Warner Co., TRADE REG. RE'. 1 16405 (FTC May 15, 1963). The Hearing
Examiner had ordered divestiture of the two ready-mixed concrete producers
which Warner had acquired, Chester Materials Co. and W. E. Johnson, Inc. The
Commission reversed and dismissed. The basis for its action, however, is un-
clear. The brief dismissal order, which was not accompanied by an opinion, stated
that the Commission was satisfied that it had jurisdiction over the Chester acquisition,
but "does not consider it necessary to decide the question of [its] legality." The
order added that "The public interest will be adequately served by exercising close
scrutiny of any similar future acquisitions made by respondent, which would raise
most serious questions under Section 7." Commissioner Maclntyre did not concur
and Chairman Dixon dissented "for the reason that he believes an order should be
entered requiring Warner to divest itself" of the Chester assets. Neither the dismissal
order nor Chairman Dixon mentioned the Johnson acquisition. Thereafter, the -Com-
mission dismissed three more § 7 complaints. Dresser Industries, Inc., TRADE REG.
REP. 1 16513 (FTC July 24, 1963); National Lead Co., TRADE REG. REP. 1 16513
(FTC July 24, 1963); Kaiser Industries Corp., TRADE REG. REP. 1 16529 (FTC
Aug. 2, 1963).
9 Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1962) ; Thomasville Chair
Co. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1962) ; Alhambra Motor Parts v. FTC, 309 F.2d
213 (9th Cir. 1962); Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. FTC, 310 F.2d 89 (1st Cir. 1962);
Korber Hats, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F. 2d 358 (1st Cir. 1962) ; Nuarc Co. v. FTC, 316 F.2d
576 (7th Cir. 1963) ; FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.)
1170771 (2d Cir. May 6, 1963) ; Rayex Corp. v. FTC, 317 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1963) ;
Central Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc. v. FTC, TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.)
1170835 (7th Cir. July 2, 1963); Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC, TRADE RE . REP.
(1963 Trade Cas.) 70861 (7th Cir. July 30, 1963) ; cf. J. Weingarten, Inc. v. FTC,
TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 70790, at 78184 (E.D. Tex. May 17, 1963).
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abnegation that has led to judicial benediction of almost everything
the Commission does.Y
I. WHITE MOTOR
For years the Department of Justice has been attempting to out-
law two of the ancillary restraints that were traditionally tested under
the rule of reason at common law, and in early cases under the Sherman
Act.1 The reference, of course, is to vertical territorial and customer
restrictions, which at one time were commonplace in dealer franchise
agreements. Beginning in 1949 the Department announced that it
viewed such restrictions as illegal per se,"2 primarily in reliance upon
dictum in United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.' It even
threatened certain manufacturers with criminal prosecution unless they
amended their franchises.' 4 The threat worked, and the Government
thereafter built up quite a skein of victories through consent decrees,
without having to subject its legal theory to judicial scrutiny."
Then the Department took on the White Motor Company.'
When this defendant, unlike its similarly situated predecessors, refused
to capitulate, the Government moved for summary judgment. The
district court accepted the Government's doctrine of per. se illegality
lock, stock, and barrel and summarily enjoined White from restricting
the territories in which, or the persons to whom, its distributors and
dealers might sell its trucks.'7 White appealed to the Supreme Court,
and the Government showed its disdain by moving to affirm.'" The
10 See Handler, Some Unresolved Problems of Antitrust, 62 CoLumi. L. REv. 930,
942-43 (1962).
11 Handler, Annual Review of Antitrust Developments, 15 REcon op N.Y.C.B.A.
362, 374 (1960) ; Handler, Recent Developments in Antitrust Law: 1958-1959, 59
CoLum. L. REV. 843, 867 (1959) ; Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 13 RECORD
op N.Y.C.B.A. 417, 434 (1958) ; HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN PERSPECTIVE 41, 142-43 n.60
(1957) ; Handler, Annual Antitrust Review, 11 REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 367, 377 (1956).
12 See Hearings on Automobile Marketing Legislation Before a Subcommittee of
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 89,
362 (1955).
13 321 U.S. 707, 721 (1944).
14 See Hearings, supra note 12, at 89.
15 See United States v. Lone Star Cadillac Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade
Cas.) ff70739 (N. D. Tex. May 10, 1963); United States v. Sperry Rand Corp., 1962
Trade Cas. 1170495 (W.D.N.Y. 1962); United States v. Shaw-Walker Co., 1962
Trade Cas. 1 70491 (W.D.N.Y. 1962) ; United States v. Spring-Air Co., 1962 Trade
Cas. W170402 (N.D. Ill. 1962); United States v. Dempster Bros., 1962 Trade Cas.
70359 (D. Tenn. 1962); United States v. Scott Aviation Corp., 1961 Trade Cas.
1170148 (W.D.N.Y. 1961); United States v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 1960 Trade Cas.
ff 69882 (E.D. Wis. 1960). For earlier consent decrees, see Handler, Annual Review
of Antitrust Developments, 15 REcoRD oF N.Y.C.B.A. 362, 374 n.57, 395 (1960).
16United States v. White Motor Co., 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ohio 1961), rev'd,
372 U.S. 253 (1963).
17 Final Decree, United States v. White Motor Co., Civ. No. 34593 (N.D. Ohio
Sept 5, 1961).
18 Motion to Affim of Appellee, White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S.
253 (1963).
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issue, according to the Department of Justice, was cut and dried, and
did not merit serious consideration. 9 When the Court noted probable
jurisdiction,20 the business world breathed a sigh of relief, and pro-
ceeded to wait, with bated breath, for the decision on the merits. Now
that the Court has spoken,2' we find ourselves pretty much back where
we started.
Viewing the case as one of first impression in the Supreme Court,22
a five-member majority led by Mr. Justice Douglas, with the con-
currence of Justices Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, and Goldberg, declined
to say whether territorial and customer restraints are unlawful as a
matter of law, or whether they must be factually tested under the
rule of reason. Before deciding this question, the majority wanted
the benefit of a trial at which the economic pros and cons of the re-
straints could be fully canvassed. The Court had no difficulty in dis-
tinguishing Bausch & Lomb, "where price fixing was 'an integral part
of the whole distributor system' . . . including customer restric-
tions." 23 Nor was the Court ready to equate the challenged vertical
arrangements with horizontal agreements among competitors to divide
markets or apportion customers, which "are naked restraints of trade
with no purpose except stifling of competition." 24 "A vertical terri-
torial limitation," wrote Mr. Justice Douglas,
may or may not have that purpose or effect. We do not
know enough of the economic and business stuff out of
which these arrangements emerge to be certain. They may
be too dangerous to sanction or they may be allowable pro-
tections against aggressive competitors or the only practicable
means a small company has for breaking into or staying in
business . . . and [therefore] within the "rule of reason."
19 Id. at 5: "The appeal does not present a substantial question because the issues
have all been resolved, against appellant's contentions, by prior decisions of this Court."
20 White Motor Co. v. United States, 369 U.S. 858 (1962).
2 1 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
22 Buit cf. Oregon Steam Nay. Co. v. Winsor, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 64 (1873), in
which the Court upheld at common law a covenant by the purchaser of a steamship
not to use it on the rivers of California. In so holding, Justice Bradley stated: "Cases
must be judged according to their circumstances, and can only be rightly judged when
the reason and grounds of the rule are carefully considered." Id. at 67. See also
Tri-Continental Financial Corp. v. Tropical Marine Enterprises, 265 F.2d 619 (5th
Cir. 1959); Hill v. Staples, 85 Ga. 863, 11 S.E. 967 (1890); Dunlop v. Gregory,
10 N.Y. 241 (1851).
23 As already stated, there was price-fixing here and that part of the injunc-
tion issued by the District Court is not now challenged. In any price-fixing
case restrictive practices ancillary to the price-fixing scheme are also quite
properly restrained. Such was United States v. Bausch & Lomb Co., 321
U.S. 707, where price fixing was "an integral part of the whole distribution
system" (id. 720) including customer restrictions. No such finding was made
in this case; and whether or not the facts would permit one we do not stop
to inquire.




We need to know more than we do about the actual impact
of these arrangements on competition to decide whether they
have such a "pernicious effect on competition and lack . . .
any redeeming virtue" . . . and therefore should be classified
as per se violations of the Sherman Act.25
The precise holding of the Court was that "the legality of the terri-
torial and customer limitations should be determined only after a
trial." 26 No view was intimated on the merits.
To the dissenters, a trial would have been a waste of time.2 7  They
would have condemned the limitations out of hand. They failed to see
any material distinction between horizontal and vertical agreements
which eliminate competition. Indeed, according to Mr. Justice Clark's
biting dissent, "the intended and actual effect is the same if not even
more destructive than a price fixing agreement or any of its per se
counterparts." 28 All of White's economic arguments and business
reasons-including its claim that the restrictions are "'the only
feasible way for [it] to compete effectively with its bigger and more
powerful competitors' "29 -were swept aside as legally immaterial. To
the minority this was merely an attempt "to make a virtue of business
necessity, which has long been rejected as a defense in such cases." "
It should be noted, however, that the cases to which Mr. Justice
Clark referred involved resale price fixing, group boycotts, and tying
arrangements.31 Ironically enough, if the legality of territorial and
customer limitations were to be determined by applicable cases, lower
federal and state court precedents would clearly dictate a verdict for
the defendant.3 2 In light of the venerable body of case law sustaining
25 Ibid.
2 6 Id. at 264.
2 7Id. at 275. Mr. Justice Clark authored the dissent. He was joined by Chief
Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Black.
28 Id. at 279.
29 Id. at 278.
30 Ibid.
31 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911) ; Fashion
Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Northern Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
32 With respect to territorial restraints, see, e.g., Phillips v. Iola Portland Cement
Co., 125 Fed. 593, 595 (8th Cir. 1903), cert. denied, 192 U.S. 606 (1904) ; Cole Motor
Car Co. v. Hurst, 228 Fed. 280, 283-84 (5th Cir. 1915), writ of error denied, 246 Fed.
831 (5th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 247 U.S. 511 (1918) ; Boro Hall Corp. v. General
Motors Corp., 124 F.2d 822, 823 (2d Cir. 1942), rehearing denied, 130 F.2d 196 (2d
Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943) ; Reliable Volkswagen Sales & Service
Co. v. World Wide Auto. Corp., 182 F. Supp. 412, 425-27 (D.N.J. 1960); cases cited
note 22 supra; General Cigar Co., 16 F.T.C. 537 (1932) ; Conference Ruling Nos. 13,
15, 21, 1 F.T.C. 543, 544 (1916); Pratt v. Marean, 25 Ill. App. 516, 520 (1888);
Johnston v. Franklin Kirk Co., 83 Ind. App. 519, 148 N.E. 177 (1925); Revlon
Prods. Corp. v. Bernstein, 204 Misc. 80, 119 N.Y.S.2d 60 (Sup. Ct. 1953), aff'd,
285 App. Div. 1139, 142 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1955); Stemmerman v. Kelly, 150 App.
Div. 735, 135 N.Y. Supp. 827 (1912), aff'd, 220 N.Y. 756, 116 N.E. 1077 (1917);
19631
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such limitations, it is astounding that the dissent castigated White's
conduct as "one of the most brazen violations of the Sherman Act . . .
experienced in a quarter of a century." "
It may be, as Mr. Justice Clark said, that "the rule of reason is
inapplicable to agreements made solely for the purpose of eliminating
competition." " But that can hardly be dispositive of the legality of
White's vertical arrangements in view of its claim (the truth of which
was assumed) that the restrictions were necessary, among other things,
to enable White to hold its own in the competitive struggle with other
truck manufacturers. The truth of the matter is that the dissenting
justices rejected the rule of reason approach even if the restraint is not
Thomas v. Belcher, 184 Okla. 410, 87 P.2d 1084 (1939); Delk v. City Nael Bank,
85 Okla. 238, 205 Pac. 753 (1922); Walter A. Wood Mowing & Reaping Co. v.
Greenwood Hardware Co., 75 S.C. 378, 55 S.E. 973 (1906); cf. Sinclair Ref. Co. v.
Wilson Gas & Oil Co., 52 F.2d 974, 976 (W.D.S.C. 1931) ; McConkey v. Smith, 112
Kan. 560, 211 Pac. 631 (1923).
With respect to use or customer limitations, see, e.g., Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn
Prods. Ref. Co., 236 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1915) ; Chicago Sugar Co. v. American Sugar
Ref. Co., 176 F.2d 1, 9 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 948 (1950) ; Fosburgh
v. California & Hawaiian Sugar Ref. Co., 291 Fed. 29 (9th Cir. 1923); Revlon,
Inc. v. Regal Pharmacy, Inc., 29 F.R.D. 169, 177 (E.D. Mich. 1961) ; United States v.
Newbury Mfg. Co., 36 F. Supp. 602, 605 (D. Mass. 1941) ; P. Lorillard Co. v. Wein-
garden, 280 Fed. 238, 240 (W.D.N.Y. 1922); Authors & Newspapers Ass'n v.
O'Gorman Co., 147 Fed. 616 (C.C.D.R.I. 1906); Buckalew v. Niehuss, 249 Ala.
585, 32 So. 2d 299 (1947); Morris & Morris v. Tuskaloosa Mfg. Co., 83 Ala.
565, 3 So. 689 (1887); California Bldg. Co. v. Halle, 80 Cal. App. 2d 229, 181
P2d 404 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947); Lampson Lumber Co. v. Caporale, 140 Conn.
679, 102 A.2d 875 (1954); Dick v. Sears-Roebuck & Co., 115 Conn. 122, 160 Ati.
432 (1932) ; Frye v. Partridge, 82 Ill. 267 (1876) ; Meyer v. Estes, 164 Mass. 457,
41 N.E. 683 (1895); Staebler-Kempf Oil Co. v. Mac's Auto Mart, Inc., 329 Mich.
351, 45 N.W2d 316 (1951); Gano v. Delmas, 140 Miss. 323, 105 So. 535 (1925);
Hall v. Wesster, 7 Mo. App. 56 (1879) ; Clare v. Ice Cream Cabinet Co., 166 Ati. 722
(N.J. Ch. 1933); New York Bank Note Co. v. Hamilton Bank Note Engraving &
Printing Co., 180 N.Y. 280, 73 N.E. 48 (1905); Revlon Prods. Corp. v. Bernstein,
204 Misc. 80, 81, 119 N.Y.S.2d 60, 61-62 (Sup. Ct 1953), aff'd, 285 App. Div. 1139,
142 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1955); Hickock Mfg. Co. v. Fairley Trading Corp., 117 N.Y.S.2d
874 (Sup. Ct 1952) ; Hodge v. Sloan, 107 N.Y. 244, 17 N.E. 335 (1887) ; Carneal v.
Kendig, 196 Va. 605, 85 S.E.2d 235 (1955) ; Colby v. McLaughlin, 50 Wash. 2d 152,
310 P2d 527 (1957) ; Messett v. Cowell, 194 Wash. 646, 79 P.2d 337 (1938). And
see the decisions sustaining restraints prohibiting purchasers of new cars from reselling
them without first offering them to the dealer at a stipulated price: Piazza v. Liberty
Motors, 34 Ala. App. 376, 43 So. 2d 134 (1949), aff'd, 253 Ala. 132, 43 So. 2d 136
(1949); Summers v. Adams Motor Co., 34 Ala. App. 319, 39 So. 2d 300 (1949);
Bay Shore Motors v. Baker, 90 Cal. App. 2d 895, 202 P.2d 865 (Super. Ct. 1949);
King Motors v. Delfino, 136 Conn. 496, 72 A.2d 233 (1950); Schuler v. Dearing
Chevrolet Co., 76 Ga. App. 570, 46 S.E.2d 611 (1948); Burnett v. Nolen, 336 Ill.
App. 376, 84 N.E.2d 155 (1949); Elizabethtown Lincoln Mercury v. Jones, 313 Ky.
321, 231 S.W.2d 42 (1950); Wade & Dunton, Inc. v. Gordon, 144 Me. 49, 64 A.2d
422 (1949) ; Stanford Motor Co. v. Westman, 151 Neb. 850, 39 N.W.2d 841 (1949) ;
Larson Buick Co. v. Mosca, 79 N.Y.S.2d 654 (Sup. Ct. 1948) ; Thomas B. Martindale,
Inc. v. Gorman, 165 Pa. Super. 612, 70 A.2d 409 (1950) ; Thomas B. Martindale, Inc.
v. Dougherty, 68 Pa. D. & C. 243 (C.P. 1949); Becker-Mills, Inc. v. Bosher, 68
Pa. D. & C. 115 (Phila. Munic. Ct. 1949). See also RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§ 516(b) (1932) ("The following bargains do not impose unreasonable restraint
of trade unless effecting, or forming part of a plan to effect, a monopoly: A bargain
by the buyer or lessee of property . . . not to use it in competition with or to
the injury of the seller or lessor") ; 6 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 1389 (1951) ; 5 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 1642 (rev. ed. 1937).
33 372 U.S. at 276.
34 Id. at 281. (Emphasis added.)
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animated solely by anticompetitive considerations. It suffices if one
of its purposes is to eliminate competition-any competition, even
intrabrand competition, and regardless of whether interbrand com-
petition is thereby enhanced. The dissenters were explicit on this
point: "To admit, as does [White] . . . , that competition is elim-
inated under its contracts is, under our cases, to admit a violation of
the Sherman Act. No justification, no matter how beneficial, can save
it from that interdiction." " These words are reminiscent of the
literalist view of the statute expressed over sixty years ago by Mr.
Justice Peckham, who would have struck down every restraint of trade
precisely because section 1 of the Sherman Act says "every." a6
It is disheartening to see Mr. Justice Clark, who breathed
new life into the rule of reason in Times-Picayune Publishing
Co. v. United States,7 perform a complete about-face in White Motor
and give vent to some of the most extreme views ever expressed
in antitrust jurisprudence. At the same time, it is consoling to see
Mr. Justice Douglas, who up to now has been one of the leading
exponents of the per se philosophy,38 quoting from Chicago Bd. of
Trade,30 and insisting on a comprehensive factual analysis to illumine
the purpose and effect of the restraint. In the best rule of reason
fashion, Justice Douglas did not undertake to accord decisive signif-
icance to the presence or absence of any particular fact; instead, he
authorized a broad economic inquiry to determine the need for, and
impact of, the restraints.
In a separate concurring opinion, however, Mr. Justice Brennan
was more pinpointed as to what factors, in his judgment, should be
considered by the district court on remand." In the first place, he
would treat territorial restrictions more favorably than restraints on
customer selection. He can conceive of the territorial limitation as
necessary in certain circumstances to foster effective interbrand com-
petition, since the seller may otherwise find it impossible to acquire
and retain adequate outlets and make sure that his product is properly
advertised, promoted, and serviced. 1 This, of course, is the heart of
the economic justification for the territorial clause.
35 Id. at 281.
36 See HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN PERSPECTIVE 4-7 (1957).
37345 U.S. 594 (1953). See also Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365
U.S. 320 (1961) ; cf. Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S.
537 (1954).
38 See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940);
United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 198 (1942); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Conti-
nent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944) ; United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287,
315 (1948) (concurring opinion).
39 Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
40 372 U.S. at 264.
41 Id. at 269.
1963]
166 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.112:159
If a manufacturer is not vertically integrated to the point where
he distributes for himself, it is imperative for him to have independent
dealers who will devote their energies to pushing the sale of his product
vigorously and skillfully. To obtain maximum market penetration,
these dealers must make the difficult, as well as the easy, sale. And if
they are free to "skim the cream" from their neighbors, not only may
the difficult sale be lost to a competing brand, but the neighboring
dealer who needs some "cream" for his own sustenance may be forced
to abandon his dealership as unprofitable-unless he retaliates in kind,
in which event a veritable donnybrook may ensue. In either event, the
manufacturer's distribution system is apt to become a shambles, with
the competing brand emerging as the victor.4"
The problem is particularly acute where the product does not
readily sell itself and the dealer must devote considerable effort to
"preselling." Here "the local dealer may not only lose his expected
profit, but incur a loss." " Still further complications are created by
territorial invasions when service is an important factor. Human
nature being what it is, the local dealer may be less than enthusiastic
about servicing a product that has been purchased outside his bailiwick,
even if he is fully compensated by the manufacturer's warranty.44
Customers disgruntled by poor dealer service, needless to say, have
a habit of taking it out on the manufacturer in the future.
Economic justification, however, is not enough for Mr. Justice
Brennan. He would make a further inquiry to determine "whether the
restraint so justified is more restrictive than necessary." 41 Specifically,
what sanctions are imposed by the manufacturer against a raiding
dealer? Is his franchise terminated? Or does he merely have to pay
over part of his profit to his neighbor? Then, again, are "less re-
strictive alternatives" open to the manufacturer? 41 Can he get along
by granting a dealer an exclusive franchise (that is, by promising not
to appoint any other dealer, or not to sell directly, in the territory);
or by assigning dealers "areas of primary responsibility" without in-
hibiting outside sales; or by establishing profit passovers at levels "so
as to minimize the deterrence to cross-selling by neighboring dealers
where competition is feasible"? "
It is difficult to grasp why the validity of the territorial limitation
should depend on the sanction that is, or may be, invoked by the
42 See ibid.
43 Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75 HARv.
L. R v. 795, 811 (1962).
44 Id. at 812.
45372 U.S. at 270.
46 Id. at 271.
47 Id. at 271-72
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manufacturer if the limitation is ignored. If the restraint can be
justified because, all things considered, it is likely to promote rather
than subvert competition, it should be enforceable. And if the method
of enforcement is cancellation of the offending dealer's franchise, this
should not render unreasonable what would otherwise be a reasonable
restraint of trade any more than a failure to cancel should save a re-
striction that would otherwise be unreasonable because of lack of
business justification. If anything, the lesser sanction suggested by
Mr. Justice Brennan-that of partial profit passovers from one dealer
to another-may be more risky, since this device might conceivably be
viewed as a horizontal agreement among the dealers themselves.4  As
Mr. Justice Brennan states elsewhere in his opinion:
If it were clear that the territorial restrictions involved in
this case had been induced solely or even primarily by
[White's] . . . dealers and distributors, it would make no
difference to their legality that the restrictions were formally
imposed by the manufacturer rather than through inter-dealer
agreement. 9
Nor do I believe that it should be incumbent on the manufacturer
to prove, once economic justification for the territorial restriction is
shown, that he could not have squeezed by with some lesser alternative
restraint. Such a requirement would be wholly impractical both from
the legal and business points of view. Suppose it appears that, in
order to compete effectively against other brands, it was reasonably
necessary for the manufacturer to have independent dealers who would
concentrate their selling efforts in their assigned territories and not
encroach upon their neighbors. How, as a practical matter, can the
manufacturer go further and prove that if he had employed an "area
of primary responsibility" clause, for example, his dealers would in
fact have invaded each other's territories to his detriment? Maybe
they would have, and maybe they would not have. 0 Maybe each
48 See Robinson, Restraints on Trade and the Orderly Marketing of Goods, 45
CoRa.L L.Q. 254, 261 n.32 (1960).
49 372 U.S. at 267.
50 The Department of Justice has flip-flopped on the use of such "primary responsi-
bility" clauses. Compare United States v. Philco Corp., 1956 Trade Cas. 1f 68409, at
71753 (E.D. Pa. 1956), with United States v. Lone Star Cadillac Co., TRADE REG.
REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 1 70739, at 77919 (N.D. Tex. May 10, 1963). See Note,
Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75 HAV. L. Rxv. 795,
797 (1962). In White Motor itself, at the hearing on the scope of the injunction after
the District Court had granted the Government's motion for summary judgment, the
Department of Justice successfully opposed White's efforts to incorporate a primary
responsibility proviso in the final decree. Later, however, the Government told the
Supreme Court that White might have employed primary responsibility clauses as a
less restrictive alternative to prohibiting dealers from selling outside their assigned
territories. Brief for Appellee, pp. 25-26; Reply Brief for Appellant, pp. 2 n.3, 16.
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would have stayed in his own back yard even without a primary re-
sponsibility obligation. But surely the manufacturer should not be
forced to build a distribution system on a foundation of maybes.
He should not be required, at the pain of incurring antitrust liability,
to experiment with "less restrictive alternatives" when, if he guesses
wrong, he may find himself out of the competitive race. It is all well and
good to sit back and theorize about what the manufacturer might get
by with. But the manufacturer who operates in a keenly competitive
business world cannot afford the luxury of theorizing. He is on the
firing line and should not be second-guessed after the event if his own
solution to the problem is reasonable.
When it comes to the customer restrictions used by White-the
reservation to itself of governmental and fleet accounts-Mr. Justice
Brennan is even more demanding: if the restrictions are meaningful,
they are unlawful; if they are superfluous, they are unobjectionable.
He states his position in these terms:
The crucial question to me is whether, in any meaning-
ful sense, the distributors could, but for the restrictions, com-
pete with the manufacturer for the reserved outlets. If they
could, but are prevented from doing so only by the restric-
tions, then in the absence of some justification neither pre-
sented nor suggested by this record, their invalidity would
seem to be apparent. 1
This is because, as Mr. Justice Brennan sees it, such restrictions
"serve to suppress all competition between manufacturer and dis-
tributors for the custom of the most desirable accounts" and "seem to
lack any of the countervailing tendencies to foster competition between
brands which may accompany the territorial limitations." 52 It is
quite evident that his hostility to White's customer restrictions stems
from his suspicion that they are "designed, at least in part, to protect
a noncompetitive pricing structure, in which the manufacturer in fact
does not always charge the lowest prices" 5 -because if he did, his
natural cost advantage over his distributors would itself effectively
eliminate their competition without the necessity for any contractual
restriction.5"
White had argued, among other things, that, until its distributors
had received extensive technical training, they were not qualified to
cope with the peculiar and intricate requirements of the reserved






governmental and fleet accounts; " hence White was fearful that it
might lose standing with such accounts if its distributors obtained the
business but could not provide adequate service. Of course, absent a
restraining covenant, there would be nothing to prevent a dis-
tributor from underbidding his supplier for a large account, even if he
did so at a loss. And he might be willing to take a loss in order to
alleviate an overstocked inventory position, to facilitate profitable
sales of other products to the account, or to gain prestige. Whatever
the distributor's reason for soliciting such accounts in competition with
his supplier, the latter has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that his
own image is not tarnished by faulty servicing or promotional work on
the part of the distributor. Here again, Mr. Justice Brennan visualizes
the possibility of using "less drastic measures as, for example, improved
supervision and training, or perhaps a special form of manufacturer's
warranty to the governmental and fleet purchasers to protect against
unsatisfactory distributor servicing." " But here again, I submit, the
businessman should be given reasonable latitude in deciding how to
grapple with the problem and not be told that he should have tried
something else in the first instance.
Of course, customer restrictions take forms other than the species
involved in White Motor. The manufacturer may reserve nothing
for himself, but, if his product is sold through different types of market
outlets, he may channel the sales of his distributors to particular classes
of customers. In this way, one group of distributors will solicit busi-
ness from one customer class without interference from another group
whose job it is to promote the sale of the product with a distinct body
of customers. This parceling out of customers was sustained a few
years ago by the Federal Trade Commission in Roux Distrib. Co.,57
in which a cosmetic manufacturer maintained separate sales channels
through wholesalers to department and drug stores and wholesalers to
beauty parlors. This type of customer restriction is certainly more
closely akin to the territorial restriction than the reservation of accounts
clause which Mr. Justice Brennan viewed with a jaundiced eye in
White Motor. The manufacturer's purpose is to maximize sales and
render optimum service through distributors who concentrate on the
classes of trade which they are best equipped to handle. There is no
reason, in my judgment, why customer restrictions of this character
should be treated more harshly than territorial limitations.
Nor does Mr. Justice Brennan address himself to such other
varieties of customer restrictions as an agreement by a wholesaler to
55 Brief for Appellant, pp. 17-18.
56 372 U.S. at 274.
57 55 F.T.C. 1386 (1959).
19631
170 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.112:159
sell only to retailers or to retailers approved by the manufacturer, an
agreement by a retail account to sell only to the consumer, or an
agreement by a consumer not to resell at all.5" Each of these restraints
may be justified as reasonably designed to achieve and perpetuate a
vigorous and efficient dealer organization which will strengthen the
manufacturer's hand in competing with other brands.
It would indeed be a shortsighted public policy that would view
intrabrand rather than interbrand competition as the paramount anti-
trust objective. The temporary advantages that might accrue to the
public by a regime of disorderly marketing under which the manu-
facturer's distributors cut each other's throats are more than out-
weighed by the resulting impairment of the manufacturer's ability to
compete effectively against his rivals. First things come first.
Hopefully, after the remand in White Motor, both territorial and
customer restrictions will continue to play their vital role in our com-
petitive economy. 9 It is inconceivable that these time-honored ancillary
restraints, after being sheltered by the rule of reason for decades, if not
centuries, will suddenly be deemed to have a "pernicious effect on
competition" and lacking in "any redeeming virtue." 10 This, to my
mind, would be bad economics and bad law.8'
It is well to remember that it was Mr. Justice Brandeis, and not
counsel for the defense, who wrote,
the legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be deter-
mined by so simple a test, as whether it restrains competition.
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade,
restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The
true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such
as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competi-
tion or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition.
6 2
I venture to suggest that it might not be amiss on the second go-round
of White Motor for this bit of wisdom to be applied as well as quoted.
58 See Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75
HARv. L. Rxv. 795, 796 (1962).
69 See Robinson, supra note 48, at 261.
60 372 U.S. at 281, quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5
(1958).
61 Subsequent to White Motor, the Seventh Circuit sustained territorial and cus-
tomer restrictions in Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC, TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade
Cas.) 70861, at 78484, 78489 (7th Cir. July 30, 1963). Cf. United States v. Penn-Olin
Chem. Co., 217 F. Supp. 110, 136 (D. Del. 1963).
62 Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
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II. THE AFTERMATH OF BROWN SHOE
Last year I noted 6 that the Government's efforts to convert the
Celler-Kefauver Act " into a per se statute had been squarely rebuffed
in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States; 15 that the teaching of the case
was that every merger is "unique" 66 and must be "functionally viewed,
in the context of its particular industry;" 67 that while market shares
are "the primary index of market power" "s and "one of the most im-
portant factors to be considered," 69 "only a further examination of the
particular market-its structure, history and probable future-can pro-
vide the appropriate setting for judging the probable anti-competitive
effect of the merger;" 70 that product and geographic markets are
likewise to be appraised empirically, and must correspond to "'com-
mercial realities,' "71 on the basis of a "pragmatic, factual approach
. . . and not a formal, legalistic one;" 72 that markets are not defined
differently under Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, but are defined "for antitrust purposes" generally; 71
and that, although the outer boundaries of a product market encompass
substitutes which are reasonably interchangeable in use or for which
there is cross-elasticity of demand, a determination of whether this
outer market embraces submarkets requires consideration of many
"practical indicia," 71 including, but not limited to "peculiar char-
acteristics and uses." 75
Following Brown Shoe, and consonant with its teaching that
legality depends on the facts of each case, the district courts within the
past year decided six section 7 cases on their merits: United States v.
Bliss & Laughlin, Inc.; 76 United States v. Continental Can Co.; 7
United States v. El Paso Gas Co.; 7 8 United States v. Aluminum Co. of
63 Handler, Fifteenth Annual Review of Antitrust Developments, 17 REcoRD oF
N.Y.C.B.A. 411, 433-41 (1962).
64 Antimerger Act (Celler-Kefauver Act), 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1958).
6370 U.S. 294 (1962).
61d. at 322 n.38.
671d. at 321-22.
68 Id. at 322 n.38.
691d. at 343.
70 Id. at 322 n.38.
71 Id. at 336, quoting American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co.,
152 F. Supp. 387, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), affd, 259 F2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958).
72370 U.S. at 336.
73Id. at 325.
74Ibid.
75 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Neraours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957)
(du Pont-General Motors).
7 6 TRADE Ra. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 1[ 70734 (S.D. Cal. March 27, 1963).
77217 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
78 1962 Trade Cas. 1f 70571 (D. Utah 1962), prob. Juris, noted, 373 U.S. 930 (1963).
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America;"9 United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co.; 8 and United
States v. Lever Bros."1 They involved mergers of every conceivable
variety-horizontal, 2 vertical, 3 conglomerate, 4 and even a joint
venture.s5 And in each instance the merger was sustained on its facts.86
It was not until the Supreme Court handed down its ruling in Phila-
delphia Nat'l Bank, 7 at the end of last term, that the Government
finally snapped its losing streak.
8 8
79 214 F. Supp. 501 (N.D.N.Y. 1963).
80 217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1963).
81216 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
82 United States v. Lever Bros., 216 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) ; United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 214 F. Supp. 501 (N.D.N.Y. 1963) ; United States v.
Bliss & Laughlin, Inc., 1962 Trade Cas. 70292 (S.D. Cal. 1962), adhered to, TRADE
REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 1 70734 (S.D. Cal. March 27, 1963) ; cf. United States
v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 1962 Trade Cas. 1170571 (D. Utah 1962), prob. juris.
noted, 373 U.S. 930 (1963).
83 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, supra note 82.
84 United States v. Continental Can Co., 217 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
85United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1963).
86 These decisions underscore that the legality of a merger must be appraised in
the light of the peculiar facts of the industry under consideration, and that mergers
may be condemned only on the basis of demonstrable probabilities, not speculation or
theory. For example, it is easy enough to allege that a conglomerate acquisition will
result in a decisive competitive advantage by enabling the combined entity to offer a
"full line." But the Government now knows that such allegations will not be accepted
on faith without supporting evidence. See United States v. Continental Can Co., 217
F. Supp. 761, 789-790 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). By the same token, if the elimination of poten-
tial competition is claimed as an anticompetitive effect, it will not be assumed without a
factual demonstration that the merging companies would otherwise have become sig-
nificant and effective competitors. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., supra
note 85, at 123-32; United States v. Continental Can Co., supra at 796, 798-99;
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 214 F. Supp. 501, 519 (N.D.N.Y. 1963) ;
United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 1962 Trade Cas. 1 70751, at 77300 (D. Utah
1962); United States v. Bliss & Laughlin, Inc., 1962 Trade Cas. 1 70292, at 76170-71
(S.D. Cal. 1962), adhered to, TRADE REG. RaP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 70734, at 77907
(S.D. Cal. March 27, 1963). Or if the claim is made that the acquisition is likely
to discourage new entry into an industry, the courts want something more tangible
than the ipse dizit of government counsel. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem.
Co., supra note 85, at 126-28; United States v. Continental Can Co., supra at 789-90,
791-92; United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, supra at 513; United States v.
Bliss & Laughlin, Inc., supra at 76162, adhered to, TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.)
1 70734, at 77907 (S.D. Cal. March 27, 1963).
87 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
88 The Government, however, obtained preliminary injunctions preventing consum-
mation of acquisitions in three section 7 cases: United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Corp.,
TRADE: REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 11 70758 (W.D. Pa. April 11, 1963), aff'd, TRADE
REG. RaP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 1 70802 (3d Cir. June 5, 1963) ; United States v. Parents
Magazine Enterprises, 1962 Trade Cas. 1170437 (N.D. Ill. 1963); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 1962 Trade Cas. 1 70419 (E.D. Mo. 1962). The Parents
Magazine case, supra, has been resolved by the entry of a consent decree. United
States v. Parents Magazine Enterprises, TRADE REG. RaP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 1170649
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 28, 1963). In another section 7 case the court refused to grant a
preliminary injunction against the acquisition. United States v. FMC Corp., TRADE
REG. RaP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 1170826 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 1963), appeal dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction, TRADE REG. RaP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 1170860 (9th Cir.
June 30, 1963), aff'd, TRADE REG. RaE'. (1963 Trade Cas.) 1170865 (U.S. Aug. 9,
1963) (Goldberg, J., in Chambers).
During the past year, the Federal Trade Commission held acquisitions unlawful
in three cases, Brillo Mfg. Co., TRADE REG. R P. 1 16543 (FTC July 31, 1963) ; Luria
Bros., TRADE RaG. REsP. ff 16299 (FTC Feb. 13, 1963); Consolidated Foods Corp.,
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The startling thing about this latest decision was the majority's
conclusion that bank mergers are covered by section 7 as well as the
Sherman Act s---not that the particular merger was unlawful once
section 7 was held to apply. As Mr. Justice Harlan noted in his dis-
sent, "[N]o one will be more surprised than the Government to find
that the Clayton Act has carried the day for its case in this Court." '
The aptness of this observation is apparent from the makeweight argu-
ment on section 7 that the Government advanced in its jurisdictional
Statement 9 and Brief on the Merits,92 and from its steadfast refusal to
argue orally the applicability of section 7 despite the Court's express
invitation that it do so.' But once the Court held bank mergers
cognizable under section 7,94 and viewed the relevant market as com-
mercial banking in the four-county Philadelphia metropolitan area in
which the two merging banks had their offices,9" the ultimate holding
that their fusion was likely to lessen competition substantially came
as no surprise. The facts were these.
TP-AE REG. REP. f 16182 (FTC Nov. 15, 1962), and has dismissed complaints in four
others, Kaiser Indus. Corp., TRADE REG. REP'. 1 16529 (FTC August 2, 1963) ; Dresser
Industries, Inc., TR"- REG. REP. 1 16513 (FTC July 24, 1963); National Lead Co.,
TRADE REG. RaP. 16513 (FTC July 24, 1963) ; Warner Co., TRADE REG. RaP. 1 16405
(FTC May 15, 1963).
At the trial stage in the Commission, one hearing examiner found a § 7 violation,
Permanente Cement Co., FTC Dkt. 7939 (Nov. 28, 1962), while examiners in two
cases dismissed anti-merger complaints. National Tea Co., FTC Dkt. 7453 (April 5,
1963); Inland Container Corp., FTC Dkt. 7993 (Dec. 18, 1962).
At the appellate level, the Commission was sustained by the District of Columbia
Circuit in Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The Com-
mission had made findings that after Reynolds had acquired its customer, Arrow
Brands, Inc., a converter of decorative aluminum foil for the florist trade, Arrow's
sales jumped; sales of five of its seven competitors dropped sharply; some were
practically forced out of the field; and others operated at substantial losses. Reynolds
Metals Co., 56 F.T.C. 743, 775 (1960).
89 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'1 Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 335-49 (1963). The
unsoundness of this conclusion was exposed by Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissenting
opinion (Stewart and Goldberg, JJ., concurring), and was the subject of critical
comment by the author in an address delivered before the Fourth Circuit Annual
Judicial Conference on June 28, 1963.
9 Id. at 373.
91 Brief for Appellant, pp. 29-33.
92Id. at 72-74.
93 Transcript of Oral Argument (as reproduced by M. A. Schapiro & Co.), pp.
21, 59-60.
94 Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart, dissented on the ground
that section 7 was not applicable to bank mergers. 374 U.S. at 373. Mr. Justice
Goldberg in a separate memorandum opinion agreed fully with Mr. Justice Harlan's
dissenting views as to the applicability of section 7, but cautioned that in his opinion
there was a substantial Sherman Act issue involved. Id. at 396-97. Mr. Justice White
took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
95 Before the Supreme Court, the defendants did not contest the district court's
ruling that "commercial banking is a line of commerce." Id. at 335. Moreover,
despite a finding to the contrary by the district court in their favor, they apparently
accepted the four-county area as a section of the country within the meaning of section
7. Transcript of Oral Argument, pp. 57, 58, 69; 374 U.S. at 359 n.36.
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Philadelphia National Bank (PNB); with assets of over $1
billion, is the second largest bank in the Philadelphia area. Girard
Trust Corn Exchange Bank, with assets of about $Y4 billion, is the
third largest. If they merged, the resulting bank would rank first,
controlling over 30% of the commercial bank business in the area;
the two largest banks (PNB-Girard and First Pennsylvania) would
control 59o, a 33% increase in concentration over the 44% share
presently accounted for by the two leading banks; and four banks would
have 78% of the business. 8  Furthermore, there had been "a definite
trend toward concentration" in recent years with a large decline in
the number of commercial banks 97 -a trend that had been particularly
pronounced in the four-county area, which had witnessed a decline in
the number of commercial banks from 108 in 1947 to 42 at the present
time."' Since 1950, PNB and Girard had themselves acquired nine
and six independent banks, respectively.99 Only one new bank had
opened up in the area in a decade, and after ten years of operation it
was still an inconsequential factor, with only one-third of one percent
of the area's deposits."°
Given these facts as to market share, structure, and history, the
recent trend toward concentration in the commercial banking field, the
role which PNB and Girard had played in this trend, and the lack of
easy entry into the market, it is not difficult to understand why the
Court enjoined the proposed merger.
At the inception of his discussion of the substantive issue, Mr.
Justice Brennan pointed out that the Philadelphia Bank case presented
"only a straightforward problem of application" of the section 7 test,
as analyzed in Brown Shoe, to "particular facts." "' Later, he spe-
cifically recognized that whether a merger is likely to lessen competition
substantially "is not the kind of question which is susceptible of a
ready and precise answer in most cases," and that a prediction as to
probable future competitive effects "is sound only if it is based upon a
96Id. at 330-31, 364-65 & nA0.
971d. at 325-26. "[T]he number of commercial banks in the United States de-
dined by 714, despite the chartering of 887 new banks and a very substantial increase
in the Nation's credit needs during the period. Of the 1,601 independent banks which
thus disappeared, 1,503, with combined total resources of well over $25,000,000,000,
disappeared as the result of mergers." Ibid.
98 Id. at 331.
D9 Ibid. "[T]hese acquisitions have accounted for 59% and 85% of the respective
banks' asset growth during the period, 63% and 91y% of their deposit growth, and
12% and 37% of their loan growth. During this period, the seven largest banks in
the area increased their combined share of the area's total commercial bank resources
from about 61% to about 90%." Ibid.
100 Id. at 367-68 n.44.
1o Id. at 355.
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firm understanding of the structure of the relevant market." 102 At the
same time, however, he cautioned against a search for "complex and
elusive" economic data-what he termed "a too-broad economic in-
vestigation"-in "certain cases" in which a less elaborate factual in-
quiry would be consonant with the underlying congressional objec-
tive.103 In such cases, he proposed what he conceived to be a simplified
test of illegality:
[A] merger which produces a firm controlling an undue
percentage share of the relevant market, and results in a
significant increase in the concentration of firms in that
market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition sub-
stantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence
clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such
anticompetitive effects.'"
Applying these criteria to the facts in Philadelphia Bank, the
Court felt that the creation of a bank with a percentage command of
30% was "undue," and that a 33%. increase in concentration in an
already heavily concentrated market was a "significant" increase.'0 5
This, of course, did not end the inquiry. It still remained to consider
the defendants' claims that the merger was not likely to have such
anticompetitive effects.
One of the principal defense contentions was that, because com-
mercial banking was subject to pervasive government regulation, the
industry should not be held to the strict letter of the antitrust laws."0 6
This argument was not merely rejected; it was turned against the
defendants. Precisely because of its unique position as "a highly regu-
lated industry critical to the nation's welfare," the maintenance of the
free "play of competition" in that industry was deemed "not less
important but more so." 107 Mr. Justice Brennan elaborated on this
thesis as follows:
If the number of banks in the locality is reduced, the vigor
of competition for filling the marginal small business bor-
302 Id. at 362.
3Id. at 362-63.
1
0 4 Id. at 363.
10 5 Id. at 364-65. The defendants had argued "that customers dissatisfied with the
services of the resulting bank may readily turn to the 40 other banks in the Philadelphia
area!" Id. at 367. To this the Court replied: "In every case short of outright
monopoly, the disgruntled customer has alternatives; even in tightly oligopolistic
markets, there may be small firms operating." Ibid.
-o6 Id. at 368.
lO7d, at 372; cf. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 12 (1958).
The Court also stated: "There is no reason to think that concentration is less
inimical to the free play of competition in banking than in other service industries.
On the contrary, it is in all probability more inimical." 374 U.S. at 369.
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rower's needs is likely to diminish. At the same time, his
concomitantly greater difficulty in obtaining credit is likely to
put him at a disadvantage vis-a-vis larger businesses with
which he competes. In this fashion, concentration in banking
accelerates concentration generally.'
The Court also made short shrift of the "affirmative justifications"
for the merger offered by the defendants. 9 In answer to the conten-
tion that mergers were necessary to enable banks to follow their
customers to the suburbs and retain their business, the Court recom-
mended the alternative of opening new branches."' As for the claim
that an increased lending limit would enable PNB-Girard to compete
for very large loans with big out-of-state banks, particularly those in
New York, the Court responded that anticompetitive effects in one
market cannot be justified by procompetitive consequences in another."'
By the same token, the Court viewed as legally immaterial the argument
that Philadelphia needed a larger bank in order to attract business and
stimulate the area's economic development."
2
Last year I warned that certain passages in Chief Justice Warren's
opinion in Brown Shoe might be seized upon out of context to imply
a sweep to the decision, which the opinion, taken as a whole, expressly
negates."' The same may be said about the Philadelphia Bank case.
It would be a mistake to read Mr. Justice Brennan's language as having
universal applicability to all or even most mergers. For one thing, by
its very terms his formulation cannot apply to vertical or conglomerate
acquisitions, since neither of these types "produces" a firm with an
"undue percentage share of the relevant market" or "results in" any
increase--much less a "significant increase"-in concentration. A
-108374 U.S. at 369-70. (Emphasis added.) The Court further noted:
[I]f the businessman is denied credit because his banking alternatives have
been eliminated by mergers, the whole edifice of an entrepreneurial system is
threatened; if the costs of banking services and credit are allowed to become
excessive by the absence of competitive pressures, virtually all costs, in our
credit economy, will be affected; and unless competition is allowed to fulfill
its role as an economic regulator in the banking industry, the result may well
be even more governmental regulation.
Id. at 372.
109 Id. at 370.
110 Ibid.
"'1 Ibid. Otherwise, "the logical upshot would be that every firm in an industry
could, without violating § 7, embark on a series of mergers that would make it in
the end as large as the industry leader." Ibid. This rejection of the concept of
"countervailing power" is nothing new. See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
168 F. Supp. 576, 617-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) ; cf. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Sea-
gram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
112A merger which results in the proscribed anticompetitive effect "is not saved
because, on some ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits and credits, it may
be deemed beneficial." 374 U.S. at 371.
113 Handler, Fifteenth Annual Resiew of Antitrust Developments, 17 REcoan OF
N.Y.C.B.A. 411, 455 n.199 (1962).
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vertical merger by definition presupposes the purchase of a customer by
a supplier or vice-versa, and does not by itself alter the market share of
either or the degree of industrial concentration. A conglomerate in-
volves diversification from one line of commerce into another, with no
elimination of a competitor, but merely a substitution of one for
another, and hence no concomitant change in market shares or con-
centration." 4 It is clear, therefore, that the Court's formulation can
be meaningful only in a horizontal acquisition case, and even then it
does not serve to foreclose pertinent factual proof.
Take, for example, the word "undue." The same percentage
share may be "undue" in one market setting and devoid of anti-
competitive repercussions in another." 5  How can a court make this
value judgment unless it explores the industrial context in which the
merger occurs-as, indeed, the Supreme Court itself did in Philadelphia
Bank? A similar study is necessary in order to determine whether an
increase in concentration is "significant." And even if a court satisfies
itself that a particular horizontal merger satisfies these criteria, this is
not the end of the case. As Mr. Justice Brennan made plain, the door
is still open to show by other evidence that the challenged transaction
is not likely to have the prohibited effects.
When all is said and done, the methodology suggested (but not
practiced) by the Court in Philadelphia Bank, which of necessity has
limited application to begin with, will probably save the courts and
litigants precious little time in the trial of section 7 cases. In this
field, where each merger concededly takes place in a unique competitive
milieu, there is no escape from the wise admonition in Brown Shoe
that the merger under attack must be "functionally viewed, in the
context of its particular industry." "-6 Or, as Judge Dawson put it in
Lever Bros.: "[T]he Clayton Act cannot be made effective by a
doctrinaire approach to the problem of competition." "'
Ever since the passage of the Celler-Kefauver Act, the Govern-
ment has waged a continuing campaign for the adoption of a set of
per se rules which would result in the prohibition of most mergers."'
In my writings on this subject, I have repeatedly pointed out that such
114 This is not to say that the acquiring company in a vertical or conglomerate
case may not ultimately improve its market position in its own or in the acquired line.
It may or may not. The point is that the acquisition itself effects no automatic change
in market shares or concentration.
115 See Handler & Robinson, A Decade of Administration of the Celler-Kefauver
Antimerger Act, 61 CoLuM. L. REv. 629, 670-71 (1961).
116 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 321-22 (1962).
117 United States v. Lever Bros., 216 F. Supp. 887, 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
118 See, e.g., Brief for Appellee, p. 131, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294 (1962); United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 1956 Trade Cas. 168244, at
71113-14 (E.D. Mo. 1956) ; Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 555, 561 (1953).
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a mechanical application of section 7 defied the language of the statute,
its legislative history, and applicable decisional law."' Finally, in
Brown Shoe, the Supreme Court authoritatively laid to rest the notion
that mergers are fungible phenomena which can be tested mathe-
matically without regard to any other factual inquiry. Taking the
Philadelphia Bank decision in its entirety, the law still requires a show-
ing, as a matter of fact, that the particular acquisition under attack is
reasonably likely to have the forbidden competitive consequences.
III. FAIR TRADE
Except for discussing Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers
Corp.,"' I have not recently reviewed the fluctuating and unstable
jurisprudence of resale price maintenance. The lot of this ugly
duckling of antitrust has not been made happier by euphemistically
denominating vertical price fixing as fair trade or by branding viola-
tions as unfair competition. We have here a striking example of what
happens to legislation when the courts disapprove of its underlying
purpose.
Recently, Mr. Justice Black observed that, "it is up to legislatures,
not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation." Under-
scoring the point, he added that "courts do not substitute their social
and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are
elected to pass laws." 1
These admonitions have been pointedly ignored both in determin-
ing the validity of fair trade statutes under various state constitu-
tions and in interpreting the legislation itself. It is an interesting
jurisprudential exercise to contrast the attitude of the courts and the
119 Handler, Fifteenth Annual Review of Antitrust Developments, 17 RECORD OF
N.Y.C.B.A. 411, 433 (1962); Handler, Some Unresolved Problems of Antitrust, 62
COLUM. L. Rsv. 930, 945 (1962) ; Handler, Recent Developments in Merger Litigation,
in SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND
GAS LAW AND TAXATION 277 (1962); Handler & Robinson, A Decade of Admin-
istration, of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act, 61 COLUm. L. REV. 629 (1961);
Handler, Annual Review of Antitrust Developments, 15 REcoRD oF N.Y.C.B.A. 362,
375 (1960) ; Handler, Recent Developments in Antitrust Law: 1958-1959, 59 CoLum.
L. Rxv. 843 (1959); Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 13 REcoD OF N.Y.
C.B.A. 417, 436 (1958); Handler, The Aftermath of the duPont-General Motors
Case, in CCH ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM 104 (1958); HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN
PERSPECrIVE 49-70 (1957) ; Address by Milton Handler, Antitrust at the Crossroads,
The Association of General Counsel, Oct 22, 1957; Handler, Annual Review of
Recent Antitrust Developments, 12 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 411, 415 (1957) ; Handler,
Annual Antitrust Review, 11 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A 367, 381 (1956) ; Handler, Quan-
titative Substantiality and the Celler-Kefauver Act-A Look at the Record, 7 MERCER
L. REv. 279 (1956) ; Handler, Annual Review of Antitrust Developments, 10 REcORD
oF N.Y.C.B.A. 332, 334 (1955) ; Handler, Monopolies, Mergers and Markets-A New
Focus, in TRADE REGULATION SFRIES No. 1, at 17, 28 (Timberg & Hoffmann eds.
1955) ; Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 9 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 171, 186(1954).(10 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
121 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729, 730 (1963).
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Commission toward fair trade with their approach to the Robinson-
Patman Act. Although both pieces of legislation have an anticom-
petitive orientation, each undercutting the policy of the Sherman Act,
one is viewed with open hostility while the other is given a broad and
sympathetic reading.
In a national economy such as ours, with fair trade statutes con-
stitutionally inoperative against nonsigners in twenty states,1 2 with six
states having no such laws at all,"2 and with the interstate mail order
loophole permitting avoidance of fair trade restrictions by having title
pass in a non-fair trade jurisdiction,2 4 vertical price control is largely
ineffectual. And whatever efficacy might otherwise remain has
been undermined by a jesuitical construction of both the federal and
state laws.
After the McGuire Act '-' remedied the damage done by Schweg-
mann, it was not long before the process of erosion was resumed on
other fronts. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., was denied the right to
fair trade drugs which it manufactured because it was also engaged in
wholesaling in competition with its own customers.' 2 6  The Supreme
Court discerned horizontal implications in the challenged vertical ar-
rangements which the McGuire Act did not shelter from the Sherman
Act's prohibition against price fixing.
Hard upon the heels of United States v. McKesson & Robbins,
Inc., came Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Secatore's, Jnc.,'2 7 in which
Esso, though not engaged in retailing, was held to be in competition
with a retail outlet for sales to commercial accounts. It made no
difference that Esso did not function on the same distribution level
as its customers and that it offered different services and facilities to
the commercial trade. Furthermore, Esso was precluded from main-
taining fair trade prices even with respect to sales to the ordinary
1.2TAD. REG. REP. 116041. These states are: Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado,
Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana,
New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Utah, Washington, West Virginia,
and Wyoming. The Idaho Fair Trade Act has been declared unconstitutional by a
lower court. Bulova Watch Co. v. Albertson's, Inc., 1962 Trade Cas. 1 70516 (Idaho
Dist. Ct. 1962). And the Hawaii Legislature recently enacted a bill removing the
nonsigner provision from the Hawaii Act. TRADE REG. REP. Report Letter No. 90
(May 14, 1963).
1= TR"E REG. REP. 1 6017. These states are: Alaska, Kansas, Missouri, Ne-
braska, Texas, and Vermont.
124General Elec. Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co., 244 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 824 (1957); see Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co. v. Masters Mail
Order Co., 240 F.2d 684 (4th Cir. 1957), afirning 140 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1956);
Revere Camera Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co., 128 F. Supp. 457 (D. Md. 1955).
=66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C. §45(a) (1958).
126United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
127246 F.2d 17 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 834 (1957).
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motorist, despite the fact that it did not compete with its customers
for that business. In short, the disqualification was not limited to
the narrow area of competition between the parties, but was absolute.
To avoid the effects of McKesson & Robbins and Secatore's, many
trademark proprietors who might have been charged with competing
with their customers in a narrow segment of their business, expressly
limited the coverage of their resale price maintenance agreement to
those areas which were indisputably noncompetitive.US Although a
number of agreements containing these carve-out clauses have been sus-
tained, 29 one was recently invalidated in New Jersey in Texas Co. v.
DiGaetana.3 The question was whether the carve-out rendered
academic the claim of a retail service station dealer that he competed
with his supplier for commercial consumer accounts, since the parties
concededly were not in competition for retail sales subject to fair
trade. The Appellate Division of the Superior Court pushed Secatore's
one step further, despite cases to the contrary, 3' and held that such
extrinsic competition would constitute a complete bar to any fair
trading between the parties under the McGuire Act.32 On appeal,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey refrained from deciding this federal
antitrust question. Instead, it rested its affirmance, sua sponte, on
the ground that it would be unfair to enforce the carve-out because
of what the court deemed to be its uncertain scope, though no such
contention had been advanced by the defendant .
1 3
128 See Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC, TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.)
70861, at 78488 (7th Cir., July 30, 1963) ; Parke, Davis & Co. v. Janel Sales Corp.,
TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 70849, at 78452 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1963);
Parke, Davis & Co. v. Rocket Drugs, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
Mead Johnson & Co. v. Westchester Discount, Health & Vitamin Center, Inc.,
212 F. Supp. 310 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Fiumara v. Texaco, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 544
(E.D. Pa. 1962), aff'd, 310 F.2d 737 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963) ;
Johnson & Johnson v. Janel Sales Corp., 192 F. Supp. 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) ; Johnson
& Johnson v. Apollo Sales, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 779 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) ; General Elec.
Co. v. Hess Bros., 155 F. Supp. 57 (E.D. Pa. 1957); General Elec. Co. v. Kimball
Jewelers, Inc., 333 Mass. 665, 132 N.E.2d 652 (1956); General Elec. Co. v. Federal
Employees' Distrib. Co., 45 Cal. App. 2d 891, 291 P.2d 942 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Texas
Co. v. Fakete, 1961 Trade Cas. 1169976 (Pa. C.P. 1960); World Publishing Co. v.
E. J. Korvette, Inc., 1959 Trade Cas. ff 69423 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959).
129 E.g., Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC, supra note 128; Parke, Davis & Co. v.
Janel Sales Corp., upra note 128; Parke, Davis & Co. v. Rocket Drugs, Inc., sepra
note 128; Fiumara v. Texaco, Inc., supra note 128; Johnson & Johnson v. Apollo
Sales, Inc., supra note 128; General Elec. Co. v. Hess Bros., supra note 128; Texaco
Co. v. Fakete, supra note 128.
130 39 N.J. 120, 187 A.2d 721 (1963), affirming 71 N.J. Super. 413, 177 A2d 273
(App. Div. 1962).
131 See cases cited note 129 supra. Snap-On Tools Corp v. FTC, Parke, Davis
& Co. v. Janel Sales Corp., and Parke, Davis & Co. v. Rocket Drugs, Inc. were
decided after DiGaetano.
13271 N.J. Super. 413, 177 A.2d 272 (App. Div. 1962).
133 39 N.J. 120, 187 A.2d 721 (1963).
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Even more bizarre was what happened in Pennsylvania in Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Mays.' 4 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that in
order to satisfy the statutory requirement that a fair-traded product be
"in fair and open competition with commodities of the same general
class," the plaintiff must prove that it has not engaged in a price-fixing
conspiracy."3 5 The fact that the defendant's answer expressly admitted
the existence of fair and open competition was not enough in view of
what the court conceived to be the overriding public interest in com-
petitive pricing. If the decision were accepted at face value, its effect
would be to convert a fair trade enforcement suit into a full-blown anti-
trust proceeding in which the plaintiff has the burden of establishing
not only his own innocence of any antitrust dereliction, but also the
competitive health of his industry. 3 "
These and other judicial setbacks have once again led proponents
of fair trade to seek legislative redress. In two states, a new approach
has been devised to overcome the effects of adverse court decisions
invalidating the nonsigner clause."' Both Virginia and Ohio have
eliminated such clauses from their statutes and substituted a provision
whereby purchase of trademarked goods with notice of the manufac-
turer's fair trade prices is deemed a contract to maintain those prices.
Surprisingly enough, in view of the earlier invalidation of fair trade,
134 401 Pa. 413, 164 A2d 656 (1960).
135 In addition, the court stated that "it is incumbent upon the [plaintiff] . . .
here to prove to the satisfaction of the court that it is not engaged in competition
similar to that in Secatore's Inc .... " 401 Pa. at 420, 164 A.2d at 660.
136 See Gillette Co. v. White Cross Discount Centers, Inc., 1962 Trade Cas.
70481 (Pa. C.P. 1962) (court concluded that fair and open competition required a
showing of "effective competition" and held that plaintiff's dominance of the razor
blade market precluded such a finding). In other cases subsequent to Mays, its scope
has not been fully explored. The Pennsylvania courts have been content to rest their
-holdings on the narrow ground that the evidence was insufficient to sustain plaintiff's
burden of proving affirmatively the existence of fair and open competition. See
Gillette Co. v. Masters, 408 Pa. 202, 182 A.2d 734 (1962) (stipulation that only issue
for decision was effect of plaintiff's failure to obtain certificate of authority to do
business cannot dispense with need to prove existence of fair and open competition) ;
Mead Johnson & Co. v. Breggar, 410 Pa. 408, 189 A.2d 866 (1963) (injunction entered
upon consent cannot be enforced without independent showing of fair and open com-
petition); Revlon, Inc. v. Kaufman Furniture Co., 1961 Trade Cas. 170161 (Pa.
C.P. 1961) (fair and open competition must be established by fact and not by opinion
or conclusion of a witness) ; cf. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Schwartz, 398 Pa. 60, 157 A.2d
63 (1959) (court will not take judicial notice of the existence of fair and open com-
petition). But in Mead Johnson & Co. v. Martin Wholesale Distribs., Inc., 408 Pa.
12, 182 A.2d 741 (1962), the court, in holding for plaintiff, did not accord to Mays
the breadth its language would suggest There, the testimony of plaintiff's area sales
manager regarding competing products satisfied the court that the statutory proof
had been adduced. See also Schering Corp. v. Martin Wholesale Distribs., Inc., 212
F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1962) ; Gillette Co. v. Warner Stores Co., TRADE REG. REP.
(1963 Trade Cas.) 70859 (Pa. C.P. 1963).
While it is at least apparent that stipulations, admissions, consents, and waivers
will not do to establish fair and open competition, it is less than clear what quanti-
tative and qualitative elements of proof will satisfy the courts that plaintiff has
affirmatively shown that its products are in fair and open competition.
137 Benrus Watch Co. v. Kirsch, 198 Va. 94, 92 S.E.2d 384 (1955); Union Car-
bide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., 167 Ohio St. 182, 147 N.E.2d 481 (1958).
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both enactments have been sustained by the highest courts of those
states. 
3 8
The halls of Congress have also echoed with reverberations of
the resale price maintenance muddle. As fair trade was being weakened
by the courts in the later 1950's, bills were introduced to reverse the
trend. At first, the approach was direct-to establish fair trade on a
nationwide basis. ' The measures now pending in Congress are
labelled "quality stabilization." 140 The words have changed, but the
melody lingers on. The current bills establish the right of a trademark
owner to retain his property right in his goods throughout subsequent
transfers until they reach the ultimate consumer. The owner is au-
thorized to revoke the right of any reseller to use his brand, name, or
trademark if the reseller engages in bait advertising, sells below prices
established by the owner, or misrepresents the goods with intent to
deceive the public. The battle over fair trade thus continues unabated.
Whether vertical price fixing as sanctioned by fair trade or cognate
legislation is economically sound or socially desirable can be debated
endlessly, and it is not my purpose to engage in such a debate. There
are many who view this legislation as basically antagonistic to the
competitive principles underlying a free economy.141 On the other
hand, forty-four state legislatures, the chosen instruments of the public,
disagree.'42 So has the Congress, 143 despite consistent opposition to
fair trade by the executive branch.
138 Standard Drug Co. v. General Elec. Co., 202 Va. 367, 117 S.E.2d 289 (1960),
appeal dismissed, 368 U.S. 4 (1961); Hudson Distribs., Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 18 Ohio
App. 2d 182, 176 N.E.2d 236 (1963). The constitutionality of the Ohio Act was
upheld by a minority of 3 to 4, since the Ohio Constitution requires six votes to reverse
a lower court decision which sustained the validity of a statute. Even stranger is
the fact that prior to the Hudson decision, the Ohio Supreme Court had dismissed
an appeal from a ruling which held the act unconstitutional, "for the reason that no
debatable constitutional question is involved." Mead Johnson & Co. v. Columbus
Vitamin & Cosmetic Distribs., Inc., TRAE RaG. R.. (1963 Trade Cas.) 70782
(Ohio March 27, 1963).
139 See, e.g., H.R. 10527, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
140 See, e.g., H.R. 3669, S. 774, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). The bills are sub-'
stantially identical, the difference being that the House bill exempts sales of pre-
scription drugs and medicines from its coverage while the Senate bill does not.
141 The very idea that a commercial entity may hold in one fettering price-
fixing grasp all businessmen engaged in vending a certain product, just as
a herdsman holds lassoed cattle on the plains, offends against the most ele-
mentary concept of a free and independent society. The Fair Trade Act is
not only in derogation of the common law, it is in defiance of principles which
the Federal government has on countless occasions enunciated in its anti-trust
legislation and litigation. Hence, the Fair Trade Act must be construed
strictly.
Mead Johnson & Co. v. Breggar, 410 Pa. 408, 415, 189 A.2d 866, 869 (1963) ; see
ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTrrRUST REP. 149-54 (1955).
142 See TAE REG. RaP. 1 6017.
143 Fair Resale Price Act (Miller-Tydings Act), 50 Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1958) ; Fair Trade Act (McGuire Act), 66 Stat 631 (1952), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)
(1958). It is interesting to note, however, that the District of Columbia, over which
Congress has legislative jurisdiction, does not have a fair trade law.
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The interesting question to ponder is the proper role of the judi-
ciary in areas in which there is a divergence between the policy views
of a judge and public opinion as reflected in legislation. Is the judge
warranted in striking down or emasculating a statute on the basis of
his personal predilections? Is he justified in giving a scriptual reading
to legislation he dislikes, while readily supplying deficiencies in statutes
he finds congenial? Should he search for loopholes destructive of the
viability of a law in the one case, while ignoring gaps in the other
which the lawmakers were unprepared or unwilling to fill? If sound
construction requires that the inadvertent omission be remedied in the
one instance, why not in the other? If construction limits the reach of
a statute to the confines of its four corners in a law whose underlying
policy is antithetical to the judge's beliefs, should there not be a like
restraint against embroidering upon legislation where the statutory
objectives earn the judge's plaudits?
In his dissent in the California-Arizona water dispute, Mr.
Justice Douglas observed: The present case "will, I think, be marked
as the baldest attempt by judges in modern times to spin their own
philosophy into the fabric of the law, in derogation of the will of the
legislature." 144 I wonder whether there are not many candidates
among judicial opinions for this signal honor.
All of which brings me to the Robinson-Patman Act.
IV. ROBINSON-PATMAN
This past year has witnessed a further intensification of the
Federal Trade Commission's relentless crusade against the "meeting
competition" defense under the Robinson-Patman Act. Twelve years
ago the Commission took the position in Standard Oil Co. v. FTC 145
that section 2 (b) 4I was no defense at all when the price discrimination
was likely to injure competition. The Supreme Court, however, held
the defense to be absolute, asserting that the Commission's interpreta-
tion struck at "the heart of our national economic policy . . . [which]
has been faith in the value of competition." 14 Having been rebuffed
in this frontal assault, the Commission then proceeded to chip away
at the defense piece by piece.
In the realm of promotional payments, it held the defense un-
available even though it concededly applied when the buyer received
144 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 628 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
45 340 U.S. 231, 241 (1951).
146 Robinson-Patman Act § 2(b), 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958).
147 340 U.S. at 248.
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promotional services or facilities instead of money. 4 " The District
of Columbia Circuit rejected this wooden reading of the statute, declar-
ing that Congress "was not shadowboxing or indulging in fine
semantic shadings." ""' Then the Commission ruled that a seller is
not sheltered if he matched a competitor's price in a sale to a new,
rather than an existing, customer.' This time the FTC was over-
turned by the Seventh Circuit on the ground that "competition for
new customers would be stifled and monopoly would be fostered." 151
Next, the Commission required that a seller affirmatively prove that
he had reason to believe that the price he was meeting was a lawful
price, rather than merely show that he had no reason to believe that
the price was unlawful.' 2 The Fifth Circuit had previously rejected
such a requirement because it would lead to "endless" inquiries into
"collateral issues" and vitiate the defense,' and the Ninth Circuit
has recently been called upon to decide the same question. 4
A few months ago, in Forster Mfg. Co.,'-" the Commission erected
some new obstacles to meeting competition, which, if left standing by
the courts, may well prove insurmountable. Chairman Dixon and
Commissioner Maclntyre, the decisional majority, say that a seller
must have prior knowledge of both the amount of the competitive
148 Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. 1129195, at 37588 (FTC
Oct. 31, 1960); accord, Henry Rosenfeld, Inc., 52 F.T.C. 1535, 1552 (1956); J. H.
Filbert, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 359, 364 (1957); Admiral Corp., 55 F.T.C. 2078 (1959);
Shulton, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. 1 15323, at 20295 (FTC July 25, 1961).
149 Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 499, 502 (D.C. Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 888 (1962) ; accord, Shulton, Inc. v. FTC, 305 F.2d 36 (7th
Cir. 1962) ; Delmar Constr. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1961 Trade Cas. 1 69947
(S.D. Fla. 1961). The Commission subsequently acknowledged the availability of
the defense in section 2(d) proceedings. J. A. Folger Co., TRADE REG. REP. 1 16078,
at 20897 (FTC Sept. 18, 1962) ; Max Factor & Co., TRADE REG. REP. 1 16165 (FTC
Nov. 10, 1962).
150 Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., TRADE REG. RE. 11 15469, at 20346 (FTC 1961) ; see
Handler, Fifteenth Annual Review of Antitrust Developments, 17 REcoRD o N.Y.
C.B.A. 411, 425 (1962).
151 Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. v. FTC, 306 F2d 48, 52 (7th Cir. 1962). The Com-
mission, with Commissioner Elman dissenting and Commissioner Higginbotham not
participating, announced that it would not petition for certiorari from the Seventh
Circuit's decision in view of the Solicitor Genera's judgment that Supreme Court
review was inappropriate. However, the Commission stated that it had not changed
its position on the legal question, and, citing the Second Circuit's opinion in Standard
Motor Prods, Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 826
(1959), it noted a split among the circuits. TRADE REG. REP. 1150166 (Nov. 23, 1962).
1
5 2 Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n, TRADE: REG. REP. 1 15893, at 20704 (FTC May 10,
1962) ; American Oil Co., TRADE REG. REP. 1 15961, at 20787 (FTC June 27, 1962) ;
J. A. Folger Co., TRADE REG. REP. 1 16078, at 20898 (FTC Sept. 18, 1962); see
Handler, Fifteenth Annual Review of Antitrust Developments, 17 REcoRn OF N.Y.C.
B.A. 411, 424 (1962).
153 Standard Oil Co. v. Brown, 238 F2d 54, 58 n.7 (5th Cir. 1956).
15 4 Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n, TRADE REG. REP. 1115893 (FTC May 10, 1962),
petition for review filed (9th Cir. July 13, 1963).
155 TRADE REG. REP. 1 16243, at 21083 (FTC Jan. 3, 1963).
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price and the identity of the bidder. It would not be enough if a
purchasing agent told the seller the amount of the bid if he refused
to divulge its source. It would not be enough if he disclosed the source
but not the amount--even if the seller's hunch was right and he hit
the competing price on the nose. This is certainly a far cry from the
Second Circuit's understanding that the requisite good faith is demon-
strated if the seller's offers "were either in fact no lower than that of
its competitors, or that it did not mean them to be." IN
The Forster case goes even further. It holds that the section 2(b)
defense may not be invoked unless there has been an actual offer by a
competitor to the seller's customer. It is immaterial that the com-
petitor's price is generally available to the trade; it must be "individ-
ually received" by each customer.157 In other words, a seller is supposed
to wait on the sideline until his competitor has raided a specific cus-
tomer and then hope he gets there in time to match the lower com-
petitive offer.
The Commission had earlier made the same contention to the
Supreme Court in FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 5 ' but the Court left the ques-
tion open. 59 The narrow holding in Sun Oil was that section 2(b)
does not protect a supplier who has granted a discriminatory price
concession "to enable its customer to meet the lower price of a retail
competitor who is unaided by his supplier." 0 Mr. Justice Goldberg
made it clear that if the competitor were either "an integrated supplier-
retailer" or if "it had received a price cut from its own supplier," a
different case would be presented.' 6' It was undisputed that there
was never a competitive offer to Sun Oil's favored customer. Hence,
if the defense is indeed available to Sun Oil under either of the factual
hypotheses left open by the Court, the Commission's "actual offer"
theory would necessarily fall. On the other hand, if this theory is
ultimately sustained, it will mean the end of meeting competition not
only in the gasoline industry, but wherever distributors or dealers cus-
tomarily handle the product of only one supplier.1 2  Needless to say,
156 Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 155 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1946), modifying 148
F.2d 378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945).
157 Forster Mfg. Co., TRADE Rae. REP. 16243, at 21085 (FTC Jan. 3, 1963).
But cf. Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356, 366 (9th Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956).
158 Brief for Appellant, p. 29, FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963).
259 FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 529 n.19 (1963).
16o Id. at 522.
3b1Id. at 512 n.7.
162 The economic facts of the gasoline industry are such that competition among
suppliers exists principally at the retail level through dealers rather than at the whole-
sale level. Almost all retailers handle the gasoline of a single supplier and act as
that supplier's conduit to the purchasing public. Thus, in United States v. Sun Oil
Co., 176 F. Supp. 715, 720 (E.D. Pa. 1959), the court noted that over 997o of the
branded gasoline purchased in the relevant market was dispensed at stations carrying
the products of a single supplier.
1963l
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a lost sale is a lost sale. It makes no difference whether a customer
fails to buy because he has gone over to a competitor or because his
own sales have dried up due to a price reduction by that same
competitor.
The Commission's theory is not only untenable as a matter of
practical economics, but it runs counter to the very language of the
statute. Section 2(b) speaks of meeting the equally low price of a
competitor; it says nothing about offers directly to a customer. A
publicly announced price of a competitor is his price.
This highlights the double standard employed by the Commission
in its interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act. When the words
of the statute, read literally, stand in the way of a finding of violation,
the Commission interpolates." But when literalism can be used as a
tool to condemn, the Commission trots out the plain meaning rule.10
This inconsistent approach in construing the same statute is
graphically illustrated by the Commission's recent decision in Fred
Meyer, Inc.8 5 There, it held that a wholesaler is "competing" with
a retailer for purposes of the prohibition of section 2(d) ; whereas in
Sun Oil it had held that a wholesaler is not a "competitor" of a re-
tailer for purposes of the defense of section 2(b). And how did it
reconcile such patent discrimination? By telling us that "the scope
of 'competition' embraced by one of the Act's provisions is not neces-
163 "Purchaser" and "customer" in §§ 2(a), (d), and (e) are stretched to include
indirect, not just direct, buyers. E.g., American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104, 110
(2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962). The jurisdictional commerce
requirements of the act are expanded like an India rubber band. E.g., J. H. Filbert,
Inc., 54 F.T.C. 359, 370 (1957). But cf. Willard Dairy Corp. v. National Dairy
Prods. Corp., 309 F.2d 943, 946 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 934 (1963).
"Commission, brokerage or other compensation" in §2(c) is enlarged from usual
brokerage arrangements to embrace commissions to salesmen. Thomasville Chair
Co. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1962). The words "for services rendered"
are read out of §2(c). E.g., Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607, 610
(4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 774 (1945). And "available" and "accorded"
in §§ 2(d) and (e) are changed to mean "affirmatively offered." E.g., Fred Meyer,
Inc., TRADE REG. REP. 16368, at 21212 (FTC March 29, 1963).
164This approach has been manifested particularly in proceedings under the
brokerage and promotional allowance prohibitions of §§ 2(c), (d), and (e). There
is no need to prove probable injury to competition in such cases, as is required in
suits under § 2(a). E.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667, 677 (3d
Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940); FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360
U.S. 55, 68 (1959). Nor would the FTC make available a cost justification defense
in such cases. Thomasville Chair Co. v. FTC, TRADE REG. REP. 29510, at 37810
(FTC 1961), rev'd, 306 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1962); FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co.,
supra.
When all else fails, and the Commission finds that neither interpolation nor
literalism will establish a violation, it invokes § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act to "supplement and bolster" the specific Robinson-Patman prohibitions by banning
an otherwise lawful practice as an "unfair method of competition." Grand Union Co.
v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962); see Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments,
71 YALE L.J. 75, 90 (1961) ; Handler, Some Unresolved Problems of Antitrust, 62
COLUm. L. REv. 930, 944 (1962).
165 TRADE REG. REP. 1 16368 (FTC March 29, 1963).
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sarily controlling 'in the context 6f another section." 166 In other
words, "Heads I win, tails you lose."
Mr. Justice Frankfurter once said that in matters of statutory
construction, "it makes a great deal of difference whether you start
with an answer or with a problem." 167 Perhaps this explains why the
courts no longer hesitate to overturn the Commission's Robinson-
Patman rulings.'" -  However,, I cannot help but feel that it would be
unwise to place total reliance on the courts to undo the serious mis-
chief wrought by the. Commission's construction of the Robinson-
Patman Act. It hardly seems arguable that there cannot be healthy
competition as long as the right to compete is so hedged with legal
restrictions that a sales manager must keep one eye on his prospect
and the other on the latest utterance of a decisional majority of the
Commission." 9 The time is long overdue for a comprehensive legis-
lative revision of the Robinson-Patman Act. The public interest
demands no less.
V. CONCLUSION
Within the next year, the Federal Trade Commission, the enfant
terrible of trade regulation, will celebrate its fiftieth birthday; a year
later the law bearing Senator Sherman's name will cross the three-
quarter century mark. Compared with the antitrust enactments of
our cousins abroad, who are paying us the flattering compliment of
emulation, 7 ' ours is a mature jurisprudence of great breadth and
166 Id. at 21215.
167 Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 CoLuM. L. REv.
526, 529 (1947).
168 See Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. v. FTC, 301 F2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 888 (1962) ; Thomasville Chair Co. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 541 (5th
Cir. 1962); Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1962); Shulton;
Inc. v. FTC, 305 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1962) ; Alhambra Motor Parts v. FTC, 309 F.2d
213 (9th Cir. 1962); Nuare Co. v. FTC, TRADE RFG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 70754
(7th Cir. April 19, 1963); Central Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc. v. FTC, TRADE
REG. RE,. (1963 Trade Cas.) 1f 70835 (7th Cir. July 2, 1963).
169 See Address by Earl E. Pollock, A Checklist on the Meeting Competition
Defense, Robinson-Patman Workshop, Chicago Bar Association, May 19, 1963.
170 See, e.g., ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, GUIDE
To LEGISLATION ON REsmrcnvE BUSINESS PRACTIcES (1962) ; FRIEDMANN, ANTITRUST
LAWS: A COMPARATIvE SympOsium (1956); OBFnoaRm, GLmss & HIRSCH, Com-
MON MARKET CARTEL LAW (1963); UNITED KINGDOM NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF
COMPARATIVE LAW, COMPARATIVE ASPECTS OF REsTRICivE TRADE PRACTICES (1961) ;
Becker, Effect of the Common Market "Antitrust" Law on American Companies,
8 ANTITRUST BULL. 3 (1963) ; Buxbaun, Antitrust Regulation Within the European
Economic Community, 61 COLUM. L. Rxv. 402 (1961); Conant, British Antitrust in
Action, 59 MIcH. L. Rav. 855 (1961); Kronstein, "Cartels" Under the New German
Cartel Statute, 11 VAND. L. REV. 271 (1958) ; Linssen, Antitrust Rules of the European
Economic Community, 18 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 289 (1963); Riesenfeld, Antitrust
Laws in the European Economic Community (pts. 1-2), 50 CALIF. L. RiEV. 459, 829
(1962) ; Riesenfeld, Legal Protection of Competition in France, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 574
(1960) ; Schapiro, The German Law Against Restraints of Competition--Comparative
and International Aspects (pts. 1-2), 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 201 (1962) ; Stevens, Ex-
perience and Experiment in the Legal Control of Competition in the United Kingdom,
70 YALE L.J. 867 (1961).
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depth. And yet there is no respite in the perplexing problems, sub-
stantive and procedural, which ceaselessly arise. The dynamism of
antitrust provides a wealth of topics each year.
The center of gravity, of course, constantly shifts. One year,
it is conscious parallelism; then intracorporate conspiracy; thereafter
quantitative substantiality; the vagaries of unfair methods of com-
petition; the enigmatic proscriptions of Robinson-Patman; and so
on. While as a nation it is not uncommon for us to swing from one
extreme to another, our temper and tradition are centrist and we gen-
erally end up in the middle of the road. The swings become shorter
and shorter but the pendulum never comes to rest.
The black and white philosophy has been in the ascendency since
the war. But judges, like the rest of us, recoil from absolutes."" Even
in the case of tie-ins, for which almost no one has a kind word, the
pressures of the facts compel the recognition of some exceptions.1 2
Business life will not stand still and neither can the laws which regulate
it. A static and rigid jurisprudence which lacks resiliency, adaptability,
and the capacity for growth contains the seed of its own destruction.
In antitrust, the instrument of adaptation and change is the rule of
reason as Brandeis envisaged it-a rule that considers "the facts
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied" '-3 and re-
quires a "factual showing of illegality" ' save where the restriction is
inherently pernicious and incapable of economic justification.
When we consider the work of the great antitrust jurists, we
find that Stone could be the author of both Trenton Potteries 175 and
Maple Flooring; 17 Hughes of Miles Medical'77 and Appalachian
Coals; 178 Taft of Addyston Pipe .. and General Electric; 1'
'7' Compare United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nenours & Co., 353 U.S. 586
(1957) (du Pont-General Motors), with Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294 (1962). Compare Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949),
(Standard Stations), with Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320
(1961). Compare Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), With
cases cited note 172 infra. Compare George W. Warner & Co. v. Black & Decker
Mfg Co., 277 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1960), with House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity
Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1962).
'
7 2 See United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa.
1960), aff'd per curiain, 365 U.S. 567 (1961); Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0.
Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961); Baker
v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1962) ; Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp.
636 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
'73 Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
'74 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 179 (1931) (Cracking
Process).
175 United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
176 Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
'
7 7 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
178 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
179United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898),
aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
180 United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
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Black of Northern Pacific'81  and Noerr;182 and Douglas of
Socony-Vacuum 113 and White Motor,'8 4 to cite a few examples. And
their decisions-sometimes for the plaintiff and sometimes for the
defendant-were right in each instance. Let us remember that anti-
trust is not monolithic. There is no party line. There are no
mechanical or slide rule formulae. Antitrust is pragmatic. It is a juris-
prudence of the facts-and if the facts are correctly found (a big if, to
be sure), the results will take care of themselves.
As I see it, virtually all of us-counsel for the plaintiffs, counsel
for the defense, the Commission, and the courts-believe in the com-
petitive ideal which antitrust seeks to safeguard, as well as the basic
principles of freedom which are its underpinning. Thus I continue to
preach that we have good doctrines, good procedures, and efficient
instruments of enforcement with which to attain the goals that com-
mand universal support ' 8 m-if we will only use them. I therefore con-
clude with the encouraging thought that the aberrations against which
we properly fulminate will not endure, and that attempts of angry young
men to find facile shortcuts will ultimately prove sterile and unavailing.
1
81 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
182 Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127 (1961).
183 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
184 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
185 See Handler, Fifteenth Annual Review of Antitrust Developments, 17 REcoRD
oF N.Y.C.B.A. 411, 441 n.2 (1962), collecting citations of the published Annual Lec-
tures; see also Handler, Some Unresolved Problems of Antitrust, 62 COLUM. L. REy.
930 (1962); HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN PERSPECTIVE (1957).
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